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This paper reviews the economic effects of collective-quality promotion through a survey of
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1Introduction
Both economic growth and international trade have put many new products on the
shelves, requiring further diligence in providing food quality and safety. As incomes rise,
consumers are more prepared to pay for quality; thus the demand for information, including
labeling and traceability, has gained momentum in Europe and in the United States. The need for
a signal may be even more important when consumers cannot be certain of a product’s 
characteristics, which is the case when agricultural products from a variety of processors are sold
at the retail level with no brand designation. The commitments of countries in the World Trade
Organization point in the direction of a reduction of state interventions to regulate the market.
Decreasing governmental protection means that farmers/producers should improve the quality of
their products and the way they promote it.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the way farmers organize to obtain and promote better
quality. Collective-quality promotion here refers to common labeling and private regulation
through a professional group. Questions of interest in the analysis include whether collective-
quality promotion raises the value of the products; who joins common marketing programs; and
whether these programs are efficient in signaling quality to consumers.
The economic effects of collective-quality promotion are reviewed through a survey of
the recent literature devoted to common labeling and professional groups, including some very
recent papers that bring to light important information for understanding the economic
mechanisms involved. Some empirical facts are also presented, mainly focusing on some
European examples, since many European countries have a long history of producer-owned
marketing programs. This European experience may help those who are interested in developing
new programs in the United States or elsewhere.
A diversity of organizations
In agricultural markets, labeling, branding, and/or private regulation all serve to mitigate
potential inefficiencies resulting from imperfect information about product characteristics
2(Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996). If consumers are not fully informed about product
characteristics, they may consume a product with an undesired characteristic or pay a price that
does not reflect the quality associated with the product in question. Although a label, a brand,
and/or a regulation are proposed as tools for mitigating market failures that have resulted from
imperfect information (Akerlof, 1970), the instruments themselves may generate other
distortions, including antitrust concerns or consumers’ misunderstanding (Anania and Nisitico, 
2005).
The agribusiness sector is characterized by the coexistence of multinational companies
wielding oligopolistic/oligopsonistic power and farmers with very limited ability to influence
prices and capture marketing gains. In the United States and Europe, the degree of concentration
in agribusiness varies considerably among states and sectors. Indeed, the three-concentration firm
ratio (CR3, that is, the combined market share of the three largest firms) ranges from more than
80% for mineral water, malt industry, baby food products (…) to less than 25% for the meat
industry, cheese (…). The strategies of quality promotion difer a lot according to the 
concentration in different sectors.
Figure 1. The number of competitors involved in one quality signal
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3Figure 1 illustrates the different types of organization for signaling quality with the
number of competitors or sellers involved in one quality signal, when n sellers are identified by
consumers in a downstream market. While a private (manufacturer/retailer) brand belongs to a
single firm, voluntary labels are used by several producers/firms. 1 Note that (i) one or several
brands may adhere to a geographical indication or post a common label and/or (ii) several
farmers may contract with a brand for the packaging and labeling of a product.
Regarding the labels, Figure 1 distinguishes between a geographical indication (with m
sellers) and a common label (with, in general, a larger number of sellers, m’>m) for insisting on
the level of exclusion. A geographical indication excludes the sellers who do not produce in the
restricted area, which can be a tool for controlling supply (implying some antitrust concerns). In
other words, if we abstract from the price rivalry, a geographical indication is a club good for
producers (Langinier and Babcock, 2005). Conversely, under a common label, all sellers
complying with the label rules may join the label, since no producers can monopolize an
environmental/ethical characteristic (Boizot-Szantai et al., 2005). If we abstract from rivalry,
common labels are close to a public good for producers. This difference between geographical
indications and common labels has been overlooked by previous studies.
Eventualy, professional groups (such as private commitees or “coordinators” under 
government control) regulate many aspects of the market, including quality calibration, quality
controls, the definition of contracts between farmers and traders, and generic producer
advertising (as the marketing-order system in the United States). In this sense, a professional
group coresponds to a “private regulation,” since the commitee decisions are mandatory for al 
sellers (as the n sellers in Figure 1) and the committee is financed by producers.
Clearly, in a very concentrated industry (with a CR3-4 larger than 70%), the quality
promotion is mainly based on brand reputation and private strategies of advertising. For instance,
BusinessWeek places brand values of US$4.05 billion on the Danon brand and US$4.43 billion
1 Numerous labels are adopted voluntarily, allowing a firm to choose either to label its product or to promote its own
brand. The state provides property rights protection and quality-monitoring assistance. Public labels encompass both
voluntary and mandatory certification labels. The choice between a voluntary and a mandatory label is a thorny task
for the regulator and has major consequences in terms of market mechanisms and international trade (see Crespi and
Marette, 2001, 2003a,b). Giannakas (2002), Giannakas and Fulton (2002), Fulton and Giannakas (2004) and Zago
and Pick (2004) exhibit some market distortions coming from mandatory labeling.
4on Nestlé (BusinessWeek, 2002).2 The agribusiness-multinational companies invest a lot in
advertising (Sutton, 1992). The existence of economies of scales pushes toward concentration
among producers/brands since promotion and advertising (…) imply fixed costs.
Because a brand is hard to set up for small industries or scattered farmers, alternative
strategies for promoting high-quality products are necessary. Producers’ cooperation (or 
collusion) may be necessary to signal quality when the fixed costs of advertising and third-party
certification are large (Marette et al., 1999; and Marette and Crespi, 2003). The reinforcement of
the cooperation among the actors of the supply chain seeks to improve quality that in turn
guarantees higher prices.3 Note that the importance of professional groups and/or common labels
varies substantially among sectors and products. This raises two important questions. First, when
are brands and/or a collective signal supposed to be selected by farmers/firms? Second, what is
the efficiency of a collective organization compared to that of a private brand? The efficiency of
labels and professional groups compared to that of a private brand is an open and complex
question that and one that this paper will try to address.
Regarding the first question, the emergence of collective signals depends on the
cost/premium of the signal and the competitive structure of the market (Marette and Crespi,
2003). If private brands of few firms dominate a market, the role of inter-professional groups
and/or labels is likely to be limited or non-existent. Conversely, in a market with numerous
producers, professional groups and/or labels are likely to be largely used by producers to promote
quality. As effects are hard to predict, some empirical facts may provide a clue. Recently, Boizot-
Szantai et al. (2005) showed that common labels are mainly used by brands for the eggs market
in France.4In Figure 2, consumers’ expenditures (in value) are aggregated by Boizot-Szantai et
al. (2005) into five categories or segments: Producer Brand with a Label (PBL), Retailer Brand
2 Improving product quality is a major issue for large companies, even if the lack of innovation in the food industry
is often underscored. As Gapper (2004) states (p. 13), “food and drink companies are mass-market machines, not
research-based companies that produce a few niche products. While a pharmaceuticals company allocates 18% of its
revenues to research, a food group spends some 3%.”
3 The market competition is supposed to be more intense with n brands compared to the other types of organization
presented in Table 1, since labels and/or professional groups imply a minimum level of coordination that may lead to
price/quantity collusion.
4 The selected characteristics of common labels for eggs are organic, farm (namely, eggs coming from a free-range
layer), and open-air characteristics, along with eggs for which the laying date is clearly indicated.
5with a Label (RBL), Producer Brand with No Label (PBNL), Retailer Brand with No Label
(RBNL), and No Brand No Label (NBNL).
The budget share of eggs with labels increased from less than 20% in 1993 to more than
50% in 2002. This increase mainly comes from the development of retailer brands with labels,
which raises the issue of the sharing of the label benefits between retailers and farmers. Prices
paid by households are higher for eggs with labels than for eggs without labels, the premium
becoming more important over the end of the decade. This simple example suggests that labels
matter for market segmentation and competition among brands.
Figure 2. Budget shares of eggs in France between 1993 and 2002
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Source: Boizot-Szantai et al. 2005.
In this case, common labels complete the brand’s reputation for increasing the value 
added of the product. An open question is the consumers’ gain. On one side, more information 
provides more products diversity, which is good for consumers. On the other side, Perloff (2004)
underlines that adding a brand (or signaling a new characteristic by a label) benefits fewer
consumers according to the product-differentiation literature due to the risk of product
proliferation.
6The question of the efficiency of collective signals deserves a thorough attention. This
paper now focuses on two types of organizations, namely labels and professional groups, and
their respective influences on the quality choices and the market mechanisms. Some empirical
examples or cases studies are useful for understanding market mechanisms.
Benefits and costs of labels
Consumers are faced with a plethora of product certification labels concerning safety,
nutrition, characteristics, geographic origin, organic status(…), respect for the environment, 
ethical conditions, or fair trade. As Hornblower (2000) mentions (p. 36) for the United States,
“environmental and social concerns are invading the marketplace as never before.” The influence 
of labels on prices is an imperfect and partial indicator of the label efficiency.
Price premium
Different types of empirical methodologies (such as experimental economics, hedonic
prices) allow us to measure the link between the label and the price premium. Most of the studies
show a significant efect on prices or consumers’ wilingness to pay, even if the price premium is 
relatively low. As McCluskey and Loureiro (2003, p. 101) mention, “The major generalization 
we can draw from [the] group of empirical studies on consumer response to food labeling is that
consumer must perceive high eating quality in order for the food product to command a
premium. This was particularly important for socially responsible and origin-based products.” 
Some recent results of the literature are presented next.
Regarding characteristics that reflect aspects of production conditions such as ethical
characteristics, animal welfare, or the absence of child labor, studies have generally shown that a
“low premium” exists for these products. For instance, premium and market valuation of
environmental attributes have been estimated in numerous papers, including Blend and van
Ravenswaay (1999), Nimon and Beghin (1999), Teisl et al. (1999), Loureiro et al. (2001) and
Larue et al. (2004). These studies show that while very few consumers are ready to pay more than
10% more compared to the price of a standard product, the market niche is a stable one even if it
7is small. The conclusions are similar for organic products regarding the small market share, even
if Dimitri and Greene (2002) show a relatively large price premium paid by consumers in the
United States. Moreover, Offermann and Nieberg (2002) (in Figure 2 of their article) gave
evidences of relatively large farmgate price premiums (>20%) of organic products in Europe, but
such a result needs to be confirmed by new studies.
Recently, labels for fair trade and fair working conditions in developing countries gained
prominence, even if the market share is relatively limited (between 2% and 4% for different
products and locations). Table 1 shows a rapid increase in the production volume under the seal
provided by Max Havelaar, one leader of fair-trade certification.
Table 1. World volume of production with the
Max Havelaar seal (in tons)
2001 2002 2003
Coffee 14 432 15 779 19 872
Tea 1 085 1 226 1 989
Bananas 29 072 36 641 51 336
Cocoa 1 453 1 656 3 473
Sugar 468 650 1 164
Rice 0 392 545
Source: ht tp: / /www.maxhavelaar .org
However, some famous brands only offer a small percentage of their production under the fair
trade label.5 In 2004, only 1% of Starbucks coffee was labeled fair trade, leading to criticisms by
some activists about this low volume (Linn, 2004). Starbucks responds that it is already a large
purchaser of fair trade coffee but that there isn’t enough of that product that meets its standards.
Table 2 exhibits the cost structure of one packet of coffee in France. The final price
difference is mainly explained by the farmgate price between both types of coffee, while the costs
are similar for other stages presented in Table 2. The “fairness” in this context comes from the 
difference at the farmgate price equal to 0.39 euros. Such a premium represents 10% of the final
price in the supermarket, which is consistent with the literature findings (previously presented).
5 Recently, eight brands in France signed an agreement with Max Havelaar for offering products made with “fair” 
cotton (Les Echos, March 4, 2005, p. 18).
8Table 2. Price of a coffee packet in France (250 gr.
and Arabica from South America)
Euros Without
Fair Trade
Label
Max
Havelaar
Farmgate price 0.19 0.58
Middlemen 0.06 -
Cooperative costs - 0.08
Exportation costs 0.14 0.14
Max Havelaar fee 0.05
Cost of importation and
roasting
1.41 à 2.61 1.45 à 2.5
Final price in
supermarket
1.8 à 3 2.3 à 3.35
Source: Lecomte 2003.
Large differences in social conditions/standards in the world explain the demand for
ethical characteristics by consumers.6 The definition of “fairness” is relatively tricky to set up. 
The Achiles’ heel of ethical labeling is the lack of a clear definition combined with a “lenient” 
certification process. In this context, the regulation is useful for imposing a clear definition for
some labels and/or for controlling the certification activity of private middlemen.
We now turn to the effect of geographical indications on market prices. Indeed, recent
papers suggest that geographical indications matter for differentiating products. Loureiro and
McCluskey (2000) show that the label of origin for fresh meat in Spain leads to price premia for
medium quality. Scarpa et al. (2005) and Whirthgen (2005) confirm the existence of consumer
preferences for territorial origin of production certification and regional food. Stefani et al.
(2005) show that, in the case of Italian spelt, a direct impact of origin on willingness to pay
exists. Roosen et al. (2003) also suggest that consumers place more importance on labels of
origin as opposed to private brands for beef, although this study is applied to European
consumers facing the mad cow disease, for which regional labels take on a highly significant
meaning. Hassan and Monier-Dilhan (2004, 2005) and Boizot-Szantai et al. (2005) show that
6 Bigot (2002) examined a variety of attribute signals that might exist in a product and showed that, at least for
French consumers, the rank in terms of importance was the absence of child labor, followed by the origin of the
products, and decent working conditions for workers who produced the product, positive environmental externalities
such as the absence of polution during the production process (…). Bigot (2002) found that 53% of French 
consumers would pay a premium for ethical characteristics and this premium would only be 5%. Another 44% would
9various officials labels or common labels matter to French consumers. Bazoche et al. (2005)
show that label information has an effect during an experimental process that compares the
consumers’ reactions to French and Californian wines. Conversely, Bonnet and Simioni (2001)
show that French consumers do not value the quality signal provided by the Protected
Designation of Origin for Camembert cheese. In this particular case, brands with large market
shares appear to be the relevant signal of quality.
Note that these results concern European markets. Even if geographical indications are
used less often in the United States than in Europe, U.S. farmers are also concerned by this tool,
for instance with the Arizona Grown label, Idaho Potatoes, Florida Oranges, Vidalia Onions,
Wisconsin Real Cheese, and so forth (Hayes and Lence, 2002; Hayes et al., 2004; and
McCluskey and Loureiro, 2003).7 Based on the European experience, the positive effects of
labels on prices may attract too many sellers/farmers, leading to a risk of label proliferation.
Labels proliferation
When no major brands dominate a market, the number of products/appellations with
official/common labels is generally relatively large. The meat sector in France is a good example,
wherein numerous groups of producers are using the official labels presented in Table 3, while
some other common labels (such as Viande Bovine Française, V 100% muscle, Agneau de nos
Terroirs, Race à Viande, le Boeuf de Tradition Bouchère, le Boeuf Verte Prairie) were recently
developed by some groups of producers or inter-professional groups, mainly for counterbalancing
the mad cow disease crises in France. The Certification de conformité produits (CCP) or the
Lable Rouge (LR) (see Table 3) helped inrecovering consumers’ trust after mad cow disease 
outbreaks in 1996 and 2001 (see de Fontguyon, 2001).8
pay no such premium.
7 Hayes and Lence (2005, p. 1) consider the common labels and geographical indications as “the only market based 
solution to the U.S. rural development problem that we are aware of.” This paper may ofer clues for knowing if 
labels as geographical indications are viable instruments for rural development in the United States.
8 Herrmann et al. (2002) exhibit a positive effect coming from the generic promotion of beef linked to the
geographical indication “quality from Bavaria”. Enneking (2004) shows that safety labeling significantly influences 
consumers willingness-to-pay for meat, with a benefit larger for the national brand than for small producers.
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For an uninformed public, labels proliferation may provide little relevant information
(Lohr, 1998). In a context of labels/appellations proliferation, a good reputation is very hard to
acquire because of buyers’ confusion and insuficient promotional eforts. The smal size (in 
terms of sales) of each label does not lead to sufficient economies of scale, since promotion
mainly generates fixed costs. Consumers are made worse off if the labels increase confusion.
Regulators in Europe set up some official signs of quality to reduce label proliferation. Table 3
gives details regarding the official signs. The European Commission and/or governments provide
a property right protection and participation in inspection procedures for the signs, and farmers
must choose whether or not to adhere to them. In Europe, Protected Designation of Origin (PDO)
and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) link products to their geographic origin, and
promote a specific taste or quality linked to a region (see EC Reg. 2081/92 and the EC Reg.
2081/92 (EEC, 1992)).
Table 3. Official signs of quality in France and Europe
Europe France Characteristic(s)
Protected Designation of Origin
(PDO)
Appellation d’origine contrôlée
(AOC)
Origin of production and quality
Protected Geographical
Indication (PGI)
Origin of production
Label Rouge (LR) High quality
Certification de conformité
produits (CCP)
Respect of some specific criteria
or processes above the standard
product
Organic Farming (OF) Agriculture Biologique (AB) Absence of chemical pesticides
or fertilizers
Traditional Speciality
Guaranteed
Guarantee of a traditional
character of a product
Source: Ministère de l’Agriculture, Paris, 2005.
For describing the effect of voluntary labels, the focus here is mainly on the French
market, where official signs are widely used by producers for the promotion of some specific
products. Based on a hedonic approach, Hassan and Monier-Dilhan (2004 and 2005) exhibit a
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significant price premium for French official labels such as Label Rouge, an organic appellation,
or geographical indications, with a higher premium for retailer brands than for producer brands.
However, Loisel and Couvreur (2001) show that even in France such signals of quality are not
clear to many consumers. For example, the recognition of quality labels by French consumers is
only 43% for Label Rouge (LR), 18% for l’Agriculture Biologique (AB), and only 12% for
Appelations d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC). Although LR is a wel-established label, which
suggests that reputation matters, the fact that less than half of French consumers recognize it is
suggestive of the problems inherent for any label. For instance, the low recognition may explain
why organic farming only accounts for a small share of production (less than 2%) in Europe (see
Offermann and Nieberg, 2002). One major problem is simply the legibility and clarity of a label,
especially one showing some official seal.
For some labels, such as LR, AOC, or PGI, production is regulated, with a maximum
yield allowed per unit of land. The link between regulations based on stringent conditions of
production and quality is shaky. For instance, the Conseil de la Concurrence (see the decision 98-
D-54 (July 1998) mentions that “the assertion about the necessary relationship between 
production increase and quality decrease is not proved.” The “blured” frontier between quality 
regulation and quantity controls implies risk of anti-trust behaviors (Buccirossi et al., 2002).
Labeling in agriculture has led to antitrust investigations for well-known products with official
labels at the national level (Esposito, 1999). In France, one case concerning poultry and four
cases concerning cheese were investigated.9 In Italy, two cases concerning cheese and one case
concerning ham were examined.10 Generally, for all these cases, the contested practices included
price fixing (or minimum resale prices), output reduction or quotas, and limits to entry (for
details see Table 2 in Lucatelli, 2000). Those practices were recognized as infringements of
national competition laws (and prohibited) because they imposed restrictions that were not
necessary for the production and promotion of high-quality products. Those cases were decided
without making any allowance for the fact that they involved agricultural products.
9 See the Conseil de la Concurrence (Paris), decisions 92-D-30 (April 1992), 94-D-41 (July 1994), 97-D-16 (March
1997), 98-D-54 (July 1998), 04-D-13 (April 2004).
10 See Autorita Garante della Concorenzza e del Mercato (Rome) decisions 3999(July 1996), 4352 (October 1996),
6549 (November 1998).
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Two short case studies, reviewed next, illustrate the success and failure of official labels
in Europe.
Label Rouge
The Label Rouge (LR) dates back to 1960 and was initially developed for the poultry
sector. The concentration of this sector in France is relatively low, with a CR4 lower than 25%,
despite a strong consolidation over the last decade. As mentioned above, the recognition of LR
by French consumers is 43% (Loisel and Couvreur, 2001). Clearly, the LR has a reputation for
quality, since in 2004, the average price was 6.06 euros/kg for an LR chicken versus 2.48
euros/kg for the cheapest chicken on the shelf.11 As Table 4 shows, LR combines a good
reputation with a relatively large market share for some products (Westgren, 1999).
Table 4. Market share of some products under
Label Rouge (LR) in France
Products
with LR
Poultry Cooked
Ham
Beef and
Lamb
Market
Share
34% 39% 1%
Source: Author compilations and
http://www.label-rouge.org/ (accessed June 2005).
Table 5 shows that LR is mainly given to products with geographical indications or PGI
(defined in table 3). In other words, LR allows local farmers to develop typical/territorial
products by benefiting from the LR national reputation. Compared to the Appellations of Origin
(AO) system, the origin-based products are mixed to high eating quality under the LR.12
11 See http://www.lineaires.com/aff_media.php?id=9760 (accessed April 2005).
12 In a context in which Brazil gains market share with numerous relocations from Europe to Brazil, the LR could
preserve one part of the French poultry production for a high-quality segment. Note that it is difficult to know if trade
liberalization in the poultry sector will favor common labels or private brands.
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Table 5. The number of products with a Label Rouge stamp
Source: Author compilations and http://www.label-rouge.org/ (accessed June 2005).
The LR system is flexible enough to allow national brands to use it. One interesting
example is cooked ham. Concentration is relatively low in the cooked ham market, with a CR3
equal to 24.5%. A dozen national and local producers/brands of cooked ham post the LR on their
products. The LR allows these brands to gain market share, since the overall market share of
cooked ham with LR is 39% (Table 4). In other words, for this specific case, the LR is a
complement to private brands.
The premium coming from other official labels presented in Table 3 is generally much
lower than the premium for the LR. The next example illustrates the limits of the official-labels
system.
The wine market and the Appellations of Origin crisis in Europe
The protection of Appellations of Origin (AO) dates back to 1935, when the Appellations
d’Origine Contrôlées (AOC) were created for wine in France. Today, AOC is used by 40% of the 
wines and 15% of the cheeses produced in France. The AO system is harmonized at national
Product Stamps with
Geographical
Information
Stamps with
PGI
Stamps/Brands
without
Geographic
Information
Total
Fresh Hog 5 3 0 8
Cooked Ham 0 0 2 2
Cooked Pork 3 1 2 6
Salted Pork 2 2 2 6
Lamb 4 2 0 6
Beef 9 5 1 15
Poultry 5 12 1 18
Eggs 1 0 3 4
Butter/cheese 2 2 3 7
Fish 5 0 3 8
Fruits/vegetables 6 4 1 11
Processed food 0 1 4 5
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and/or European levels (see Table 2). The efficiency of this system is hard to evaluate. As
Clemens (2005, p. 8) notes, “One measure of the success of these investments is the 
approximately 700 geographical indications (excluding wines and spirits) currently registered in
the European Union and the continuous stream of applications to register more products.” 
However, the folowing example regarding wine mitigates this idea of “success.” New 
international competition has significantly changed the world market, which underlines the
fragility of the AO. For 15 years, wine producers from Australia, California, and Chile (…) have 
contested European leadership in world markets and European countries lost world market share
(Economist, 1999a,b).
Globalization and trade liberalization lead to new contexts of competition that modify
signaling and promotion strategies. As effects are hard to predict, some theoretical conjectures
are useful for understanding market mechanisms. Opening the domestic market to imports from
other countries may result in an increase in domestic welfare, even in the absence of comparative
advantage in production cost. The reason is that potential competition increases the incentive for
the domestic producer to differentiate itself by acquiring more information and disclosing it to
the consumer. Competition incites the producer to test its products and signal its quality.
However, when the detection/advertising cost is high (and a fixed cost), trade liberalization may
result in a potential decrease in domestic welfare since the signal of its high quality by the
domestic producer is made costlier by the competition from the importer. This simple conjecture
shows the complexity of the market’s efects.
The wine sector in the European Union is based on the AO for medium- and high-quality
wines, where grape production is regulated, with a maximum yield allowed per unit of land. This
yield system, which is often disconnected from market demand, does not impede excess supply
in some areas, as for the Beaujolais area in France in 2005 (Bombaron, 2005). The maximum
yield imposed on AO farmers may impede farmers to reach the minimum-efficient scale. Benitez
et al. (2005) compare the cost structure of AO producers with non-AO producers for the
production of French Brie cheese. They exhibit that AO producers face a more costly production
technology and do not profit from scale economies. Some European AO impose numerous
restrictions that stifle the search for commercial efficiency. The excess of regulation for linking
origin and quality seems problematic (see Zago and Pick, 2004, and Ribaut, 2005). Conversely,
15
the main features of regulations in the United States, Chile, and Australia are the lack of detailed
rules, that is, the freedom to experiment with new techniques; the production and marketing of
wines according to single varieties of grapes, sometimes associated with the production region;
and a very intense use of marketing investments. All of these features appear to be quite relevant
in the world market.
Wineries in Australia are much bigger than the ones in Europe. The average vineyard size
in France is less than 2 hectares versus 111 hectares in Australia. Four firms are dominating the
Australian market, namely, Foster, Southcorp, Hardy, and Orlando Wyndham. The combined
production share of the four largest firms in New Zealand is 85%, while the combined production
share of the two largest firms in South Africa is 80%.13 Unlike the industry in Australia or Chile,
the wine industry in Europe is very fragmented. The opportunities for mergers in Europe are
limited by ownership structures with scattered producers, geographic boundaries, and/or product
diversity. Indeed, apart from some notable exceptions, e.g., the Champagne (Economist, 2003) or
Bordeaux regions, the wine industry in Europe is made up of many small firms, which may lack
adequate capital for the necessary investments in new technologies and marketing policies.
The small size of wineries in Europe reinforces the problem of the proliferation of
appellations (Marette and Zago, 2003). Peri and Gaeta (1999) count more than 400 official
appellations in the wine sector in Italy, 450 AOC in France, and 1,397 in the wine sector in
Europe. Such profusion assures product diversity but certainly increases buyer confusion (see
Consumer Reports, 1997). The recognition of quality labels by French consumers is only 12% for
Appelations d’Origine Contrôlée, the French AO system (see Loisel and Couvreur, 2001). 
Recently, Berthomeau (2002) discusses the difficulty that the various French appellations have
had in entering new export markets because of the absence of any clear specification of the label
that distinguishes one appelation from another in consumers’ minds. The colective reputation of 
French wines plummeted during the last decade (Conan, 2005; Echikson, 2005; and Ribaut,
2005). The inter-professional group of Bordeaux producers (CIVB, Conseil Interprofessionnel
13 Recent international mergers revamped international wine trading (Marsh, 2003a,b). In 2000, Foster merged with
Beringer, a Californian wine firm. In 2003, Hardy merged with Constellation Brands, a U.S. company. As Marsh
(2003b) puts it, those mergers underminedEurope’s dominance of the sector.
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des vins de Bordeaux) completely revamped its generic advertising campaign for reaching
consumers of different countries in order to restore its collective reputation (Germain, 2005).
In addition, in Europe, wineries may be consolidated and/or the French AO system may
be strongly reformed (Giraud-Heraud et al., 2002 and Ribaut, 2005). Indeed, the Champagne
appellation is an example in which the combination of famous brands (with large vineyard size
and enough capital for advertising) and a prestigious AO matters for consumers ready to pay a
large premium (see Combris et al., 2003). An “eficient” combination of brands and AO also
characterizes the Napa Valley appellation, which generates a price premium compared to an
equivalent-quality bottle with a different appellation (Bombrun and Sumner, 2003). A possible
solution for improving the European AO system would consist in simplifying the AO rules, by
associating brands with a production region such as Bordeaux or Chianti. Simplified rules would
not impede the brand/wineries consolidation that is necessary to improve quality.
Eventually, geographical indications raise the issue of the compatibility of the AO with
the TRIPS agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). Geographical
indications signaling a particular quality are protected under articles 22 to 24 of the TRIPS
agreement. If a quality dimension is recognized for a product coming from a single area, no
producer external to this area is allowed to mimic the indication. Some tensions about the
definitions of geographical indications between Europe and the United States (Babcock and
Clemens, 2004) led to a recent panel on geographical indications (WTO, 2005). The panel
suggested that some points of the EC regulation 2081/92 regarding the role of governments has
to be amended, while the panel recognizes that some articles of the TRIPS Agreement was not
violated by the EC regulation 2081/92 (see Clemens, 2005, for details). More generally, the issue
of AO regarding international trade may be overstated, since the previous example underscores
the fragility of the AO system for wine coming from the recent changes in the world wine
market.
All the previous results suggest that common labels matter to consumers and explain the
price differentiation. The mechanisms are complex and market specific. The assessment of
common labels or geographical indications is uneven. The positive effect is the existence of price
premiums for common labels for numerous food products, as previously demonstrated. However,
17
the main drawbacks are the labels’ proliferation and the consumers’ confusion, which limits the
efficiency of such a system for signaling quality. Label proliferation may create confusion for
consumers, so that the main role for a regulator consists of (1) impeding false information linked
to a label (Browne et al., 2000), (2) defining a sufficient level of effort and/or a quality standard
corresponding to a label, especially one showing some official seal (Table 3), and (3) insuring the
credibility of the certification (Crespi and Marette, 2003b). The quality policy of professional
groups is the focus of the next section.
Professional groups
Professional groups aim at improving the quality of products through research and
development, advertising, and/or economic studies. The decisions of a professional group
become compulsory for all members of the supply chain. Professional groups operate at the
national and local levels.
U.S. marketing orders are industry groups that mandate compliance for 100% of the
producers in a particular industry and are headed by board members elected from that industry
(see Crespi and Sexton, 2003). The mandatory nature of marketing orders facilitates agreement
on the issues. Crespi and Sexton (2003) recently reviewed the performance of marketing orders,
but there is a dearth of work investigating the influence of marketing orders in the context of
quality differences among products. Indeed, there are possible tensions among farmers with
differentiated products, since marketing orders attempt to market all products through generic
advertising presenting products as “similar,” in an atmosphere where producers seek to add value 
through greater differentiation of their own goods from those of their competitors. Notably, there
are complaints by some producers who seek to differentiate their goods yet must contribute funds
to programs that promote generic commodities. Product differentiation and concentration may
limit the possibility of reaching agreements for collective promotion (see Crespi and Marette,
2003c).
The structure of marketing orders is very close to that of some European inter-
professional groups. Even if the inter-professional groups are recognized at the E.U. level by the
EC Regulations 2200/96 and 2201/96, this form of organization was mainly developed in France.
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The French law of July 10, 1975 (revised by the law of July 9, 1999) authorized professionals to
create an inter-professional group. The agreements are elaborated by the inter-professional
association and are submitted to the state, which grants authorization to “extend” the agreement. 
Thus, the decisions of the board can become compulsory for all members of the supply chain.
Indeed, these agreements aim to finance the inter-professional association, regulate the market,
and improve the quality of the products through research and development, advertising, or
economic studies (…). 
As Nefussi and Rio (2001) and Valceschini (2002) emphasize, there is a diversity of
organizations/decision types among the inter-professional groups for regulating the supply chain.
Valceschini (2002) mentions some limits for regulating a supply chain through an inter-
professional group. In particular, the collective quality management is a limited tool for
alleviating crises linked to excess supply. Antitrust regulation impedes quantity/price controls
inside an inter-professional group. The only way to avoid crises of excess supply is
consolidation/mergers among farmers/brands.
Table 6. Some of the national inter-professional groups in France
Inter-professional group Sector
INTERBEV (Association Nationale
Interprofessionnelle du Bétail et des Viandes)
Meat
INTERFEL (Interprofession de la filière des
Fruits et Légumes Frais)
Fresh Fruits and vegetables
ANIFELT (Association Nationale
Interprofessionnelle des Fruits et Légumes
Transformés)
Processed and Canned Fruit and Vegetables
Source: http://www.interbev.asso.fr; http://www.interfel.com, http://www.anifelt.com/.
Collective-quality programs matter in attracting consumers. For instance, INTERBEV
was very active in quality policy and promotion during the mad cow disease crisis in 2001-2002,
alowing the recovery of consumers’ trust. The case of potatoes in France, reviewed next, 
demonstrates the importance of product differentiation.
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The potato example
An analysis of the “ware” potato sector is particularly interesting because this sector has 
experimented with the development of new varieties (see Marette and Nefussi, 2003). Indeed,
until the end of the 1980s, the potato sector was essentially characterized by relatively
homogenous and low-quality production. Under the impetus of inter-professional groups, this
sector underwent profound changes at the beginning of the 1990s with the production of new
varieties of potatoes, providing new varieties to consumers.
Until the end of the 1980s, potatoes seemed to be a homogenous and basic commodity
and were little differentiated in spite of the existence of several varieties. At the time, the supply
chain was characterized by the production of essentially one variety of potato (the Bintje), which
represented approximately 70% of the market share until 1990 (see Figure 3). In France, the
consumption of potatoes per capita dropped continuously between 1950 and 1990. During the
1980s, the supply chain experienced several economic crises because of overproduction, causing
prices to drop dramatically (Boucher, 1985). In the face of these crises, interventions were aimed
at limiting supply. But the failure of interventions to stop the collapse of prices led different
actors in the supply chain to change dramatically the modes of production, the inter-sector
organization, and the type of intervention in the market. The inter-professional group CNIPT was
officially recognized on July 27, 1977. This inter-professional association is private but it is
granted powers by the state. These agreements are elaborated by the inter-professional
association and are submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economy and
Finance who grant authorization to “extend” the agreement.14
The CNIPT has promoted the renewed viability of the domestic potato market since 1990
in part through the introduction and marketing of new varieties.The “fresh products” orientation 
chosen for potatoes created the possibility of a segmentation of the market for new varieties of
potatoes (Pouzin, 1990). A real process of differentiation modified the structure of the market
14 Thus, the decisions of the CNIPT become compulsory for all members of the supply chain. The anti-trust
regulation limited the CNIPT’s freedom of intervention. The Competition Council twice imposed sanctions on the 
CNIPT for certain practices enacted to supply restrictions. One decision by the Competition Council (94-D-54) on
October 25, 1994, resulted in the CNIPT and some groups being sanctioned for opposing some operations
undertaken in 1988 by supermarkets to promote Bintje potatoes. The Competition Council noted that “the defense of 
their members’ interests does not authorize professional organizations to resort to practices with the purpose of 
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(Estrade, 1990). Figure 3 shows that the segmentation of the market occurred at the detriment of
the Bintje variety and for the benefit of firm-fleshed varieties (“Charlote” or “Roseval” for 
example) and the “other varieties” categories. 
Indeed, the prices for the new segments of “firm-fleshed” potatoes and “other varieties” 
are higher than those for the Bintje. In particular, the prices of the firm-fleshed potatoes are at
least two- to threefold higher than the prices of the Bintje. Consumers have substituted the Bintje
(suitable for frying for example) for varieties suitable to new modes of cooking (steam, oven) or
consumption (salads). In 2002, the Bintje potato only had a 12% market share of the retail
market.
Figure 3: The market share of the three main types of potatoes in France
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Source: Marette and Nefussi (2003) and SECODIP-CNIPT.
This evolution of the market is the result of a double action: the action carried out by the
CNIPT and the action of the enterprises at the diferent stages of the “ware potato” supply chain. 
Market regulation takes the following form: (a) quality improvement at all stages of the chain, in
particular through the commercialization of washed products; (b) segmentation of the market by
highlighting the relation between the variety and its culinary use, in order to make the product
imposing a minimum seling price.”
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more appealing; and (c) generic communication on the diversity and benefits (in particular the
nutritional benefits) of potatoes. Moreover, certain farms have been radically transformed by
becoming commercial enterprises in their own right, carrying out the sorting, packaging, and
quality control themselves (Gosselin, 2003). All these practices represent high fixed costs that are
only covered if the enterprise realizes high profits and important turnovers. The number of
producers dropped from 278,000 in 1995 to 90,000 in 1993. Thus, the implementation of an
inter-professional quality policy has been accompanied by a movement of concentration of farms.
The action of the CNIPT was essential to facilitate the emergence of new varieties of potatoes
that are more remunerative for producers and more innovative for consumers in terms of variety
and culinary uses.
The potato program sought to increase value by differentiating products from one another.
Even though this example is specific to one product (and not directly applicable to other fruit and
vegetable supply chains), it shows that innovation is crucial to ensure remunerative prices.15
Conclusion
This paper introduced some economic effects linked to different types of programs used
for promoting quality. All the results reviewed here suggest that labels/professional groups often
matter to consumers and partially explain the price differentiation. The positive effect is the
existence of price premiums coming from collective programs for numerous food products as
demonstrated in the examples. This paper showed that in some cases the collective-quality
promotion can be a successful strategy for firms/farmers.
The main drawbacks are the labels’ proliferation and the consumers’ confusion, which
limits the efficiency of such a collective system for signaling quality. Clearly, conditions for the
success of collective-quality promotion are the absence of signals proliferation and the absence
of excess regulation that may impede the existence of economies of scale, brand reputation and
15 The other producer groups presented in Table 6 encounter difficulties in impeding an excess supply crisis. Thus, le
Monde (Farmers’ trade unions’ cal for mobilization) of May 22, 2003, noted that “Al the trade unions draw 
attention to the fact that crises in the poultry, pork, fruit and vegetables, wine and milk sectors of agriculture are
multiplying.” 
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product differentiation. The paper also showed that these collective programs are not
incompatible with the development of private brands. The analysis of the optimal combination of
private brands with collective-quality promotion needs to be refined by new studies.
23
References
Akerlof, G. (1970). “The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(1): 488-500.
Anania, G., and R. Nisitico (2005). “Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets:
What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fuly Trusted?” Forthcoming in Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economy.
Babcock, B., and R. Clemens (2004). “Geographical Indications and Property Rights:Protecting Value-
Added Agricultural Products.” MATRIC Briefing Paper 04-MBP 7. Midwest Agribusiness Trade
Research and Information Center, Iowa State University, May 2004.
Bazoche, P., P. Combris and E. Giraud-Heraud (2005). “Wilingness to Pay for Appelation of Origin in
the World Chardonnay’s war: an Experimental Study.” Mimeo., INRA, Ivry, France.
Benitez, D., Z/ Bouamra-Mechemache, and J. Chaaban (2005). “Public Labeling Revisited: The Role of 
Technological Constraints Under Protected Designation of Origin Regulation.” EAAE Congress, 
Copenhagen, August 24-27.
Berthomeau, J. (2002). Comment Mieux Positionner Les Vins Français Sur Les Marchés d’Exportation?
Ministère de l’Agriculture, Paris.
Bigot, R. (2002).“La Consommation‘Engagée’: Mode Passagère Ou Nouvelle Tendance De La
Consommation?”Les 4 Pages Des Statisitiques Industrielles, SESSI, DIGITIP, Ministère de
l’Economie et des Finances et de l’Industrie, Paris.
Blend, J., andE. van Ravenswaay (1999). “Measuring Consumer Demand for Ecolabeled Apples.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(5): 1072-1077.
Boizot-Szantai, Ch., S. Lecocq, and S. Marette (2005).“Common Labels and Market Mechanisms.” 
Mimeo., INRA-CORELA, IVRY, France.
Bombaron, E. (2005).“Le torchon brûle en Beaujolais.”Le Figaro, 12 Août 2005, p. 4.
Bombrun, H., and D. A. Sumner (2003). “What Determines the Price of Wine? The Value of Grape
Characteristics and Wine Quality Assessments.” AIC Issues Brief 18, Agricultural Issues Center,
University of California.
Bonnet, C., andM. Simioni (2001). “Assessing Consumer Response to Protected Designation of Origin 
Labeling: A Mixed Multinomial Logit Approach.” European Review of Agricultural Economics
28(4): 433-449.
Boucher, P. (1985). La crise. La Pomme de Terre Française, no. 431, p. 307.
Browne, A., P. Harris, A. Hofny-Colins, N. Pasiecznik, and R. Walace (2000). “Organic Production and 
Ethical Trade: Definition, Practice and Links.” Food Policy 25(1), 69-89.
Buccirossi, P., S. Marete, and A. Schiavina (2002). “Competition Policy and the Agribusiness Sector in
the European Union.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 29(3): 373-397.
BusinessWeek (2002). “The 100 Top Brands.” BusinessWeek, August 5-12, 2002, p. 5-12.
Caswel, J., and M. Mojduszka (1996). “Using Informational Labeling to Influence The Market for
Quality in Food Products.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(5): 1248-1253.
Clemens, R. (2005). “Geographical Indications, the WTO and Iowa-80 Beef.” Iowa Ag Review, Spring,
pp. 8-9.
Combris, P., C. Lange, and S. Issanchou (2003). “Assessing the Effect of Information on the Reservation 
Price for Champagne: What are Consumers Actualy Paying for?” In The Economics of Wine, O.
Ashenfelter and V. Ginsburgh (eds.), Princeton University Press.
Conan, E. (2005).“Le prix de l’excellence.”L’Express. 5 September, p. 48.
Consumer Reports (1997). “Wine Without Fuss.” October, pp. 10-16.
24
Crespi, J.M., and S. Marette (2001). “How Should Food Safety Certification Be Financed?” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(4): 852-861.
Crespi, J.M., and S. Marete (2003a). “‘Does Contain’ vs. ‘Does Not Contain’: Does It Mater Which 
GMO Label Is Used?” European Journal of Law and Economics 16(3): 327-344.
Crespi, J.M., and S. Marete (2003b). “Some Economic Implications of Public Labeling.” Journal of
Food Distribution Research 34: 83-94.
Crespi, J.M., and S. Marete (2003c). “Are Uniform Assessments for Marketing Orders Optimal if 
Products Are Differentiated?” Agribusiness: An International Journal 19(3): 367-377.
Crespi, J.M., and R. Sexton (2003). “Competition, U.S. Farmer Cooperatives, and Marketing Orders.” 
English version of the Economie Rurale, November 2003 article (Concurrence, coopératives de
producteurs et Marketing Orders aux Etats-Unis).
http://www.agecon.ksu.edu/jcrespi/selected_research_papers.htm.
De Fontguyon, G. (2001).“La démarche qualité, vers quelles stratégies?”Viandes Prod. Carnées. 22(3):
87-89.
Dimitri, C., and C. Greene (2002). “Recent Growth Paterns in the U.S. Organic Food Market.” AIB-777,
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Washington, D.C.
Echikson, W. (2005). “In Bordeaux, The Price May Not Be Right.” Wall Street Journal, September 2, p.
W5.
Economist (1999a). “Sticky Labels.” May 1, p. 79.
Economist(1999b). “The Globe in a Glass: A Survey of Wine.” December 18-30, pp. 97-115.
Economist (2003). “Blended.” January 25, p. 61.
EEC (European Economic Community) (1992). Directives n. 2081/92 and n.2082/92 (L. 208), Brussels,
Belgium.
Enneking, U. (2004). “Wilingness-to-Pay for Safety Improvements in the German Meat Sector: The
Case of the Q&S Label.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 31(2): 205-223.
Esposito, F. (1999). “Competition Policy and Competitiveness of Agro-Food Sector.” In European Agro-
Food System and the Challenge of Global Competition. Ismea, Milano, Italy.
Estrade, J.F. (1990).“Qualité, qualité, qualité.” La Pomme de Terre Française, no. 458, p. 107.
Fulton, M., and K. Giannakas (2004).“Inserting GM Products into the Food Chain: The Market and
Welfare Effects of Different Labeling and Regulatory Regimes.”American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 86: 42-60.
Gapper, J. (2004). “How to Get Fat on a Healthy Diet.” Financial Times, May 11, p. 13.
Germain, S. (2005 ).“Le tournant stratégique du vin français.”Les Echos. Mardi 21 Juin, p. 8.
Giannakas, K.(2002). “Information Asymmetries and Consumption Decisions in Organic Food Product
Markets.”Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 50: 35-50.
Giannakas, K., and M. Fulton (2002).“Consumption Effects of Genetic Modification: What If
Consumers Are Right?”Agricultural Economics 27: 97-109.
Giraud-Heraud, E., L.G. Soler, and H. Tanguy (2002). “Concurrence Internationale dans le secteur 
viticole : quel avenir au modèle d’Appelation d’Origine Contrôlée?” INRA-Sciences Sociales, no.
5-6/01, Juillet.
Gosselin, J.L. (2003). Intervention au colloque SFER-INRA, La politique de la Concurrence, 11 Mars
2003, INAPG Paris.
Hassan, D., and S. Monier-Dilhan (2004). “National Brands or Stores Brands: Competition through 
Public Quality Labels.” Cahier de recherches, 2004-09, INRA-ESR Toulouse.
Hassan, D., and S. Monier-Dilhan (2005). “Signes Officiels de Qualité: Faut-il avoir peur des marques de
distributeurs.” INRA Sciences Sociales, 6-04, Avril 2005.
Hayes, D., and S. Lence (2002). “A New Brand of Agriculture: Farmer-Owned Brand Reward
Innovation.” Choices, Fall, pp. 6-10.
Hayes, D., and S. Lence (2005). “Geographic Indications and Farmer-Owned Brand: Why Do the U.S.
and E.U. Disagree?” Mimeo., Iowa State University.
25
Hayes, D., S. Lence, and A. Stoppa (2004). “Farmer-Owned Brands?” Agribusiness: An International
Journal 20: 269-285.
Herrmann, R., S. Thompson, and S. Krischik-Bautz (2002).“Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and 
Generic promotion of Beef: An analysis for Quality of Bavaria.” Agribusiness: An International
Journal, 18(3): 369-385.
Hornblower, M. (2000). “Wake Up and Smel the Protest.” Time, April 17, p. 36.
Langinier, C., and B. Babcock (2005). Choice between Different Certifications.” Paper presented at 
American Agricultural Economics annual meeting, July 24-27, Rhode Island, MD.
Larue, B., G. West, C. Gendron, and R. Lambert. (2004). “Consumer Response to Functional Foods 
Produced by Conventional, Organic or Genetic Manipulation.” Agribusiness: An International
Journal 20(2): 155-166.
Linn, A. (2004). “Starbucks Smelling the Coffee.”Miami Herald, April 17.
Lohr, L. (1998). Welfare Effects of Eco-Label Proliferation: Too Much of A Good Thing, University of
Georgia.
Loisel, J.P., and A. Couvreur (2001). Les Français, La Qualité De L’alimentation Et L’information.
Credoc INC, Paris.
Loureiro, M.L., and J.J. McCluskey (2000). “Assessing Consumer Response to Protected Geographical 
Identification Labeling.” Agribusiness 16(3): 309-320.
Loureiro, M.L., and J.J. McCluskey (2001). “Assessing Consumers Preferences for Organic, Eco-Labeled
and Regular Apples.”Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 26(1): 404-416.
Lucateli, S. (2000). “Appelations of Origin and Geographical Indications in OECD Member Countries: 
Economic and Legal Implications.” OECD, Paris.
Marete, S., J. M. Crespi, and A. Schiavina (1999). “The Role of Common Labeling in A Context of
Asymmetric Information.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 26(2): 167-178.
Marette, S., and J. Crespi (2003).“Can Quality Certification Lead to Stable Cartel.” Review of Industrial
Organization 23(1, August): 43-64.
Marette, S., and J. Nefussi (2003).“Quel rôle pour les interprofessions dans la régulation des marchés
agricoles: l’exemple de la pomme de terre de consommation en France.”Mimeo., INRA, Paris.
Marette, S., and A. Zago (2003).“Advertising, Collective Action and Labelling in the European Wine
Markets.”Journal of Food Distribution Research 34: 117-126.
Marsh, V. (2003a). “BRL Hardy Soars after Constelation Talks.” Financial Times, January 14.
Marsh, V. (2003b). “Australia and US Put Case for New Wine Order.” Financial Times, January 15.
McCluskey, J., and M. Loureiro (2003). “Consumer Preferences and Wilingness-to-Pay for Food
Labeling: A Discussion of Empirical Studies.” Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3): 95-
102.
Nefussi, J., and Y. Rio (2001). Gérer les marchés et la qualité alimentaire: double défi pour les
interprofessions, Club Demeter, Cahier no. 10.
Nimon, W., and J. Beghin (1999). “Are Eco-Labels Valuable? Evidence from the Apparel Industry.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(3): 801-811.
Offermann, F., and H. Nieberg (2002).“Does Organic Farming Have a Future in Europe?” EuroChoices,
Summer, pp. 12-16,.
Oniflhor (2002). Conseil de direction de l’oniflhor du 25 juin 2002 secteur fruits et légumes, 
Communiqué de Presse no. 3/03, 2002
Peri, C., and D. Gaeta (1999). “Designations of Origins and Industry Certifications as Means of 
Valorizing Agricultural Food Products.” In The European Agro-Food System and The Challenge
of Global Competition, ISMEA, Milan, Italy.
Perloff, J. (2004). “Product Diversity. All Food Is Not Created Equal: Policy for Agricultural Product
Differentiation.”Farm Foundation, Giannini Foundation, USDA ERS,
Berkeley, California, November 15.
Pouzin, H. (1990). La Pomme de Terre Française, 1990, no. 456, p. 3.
26
Ribaut, J.C. (2005). “Peut-on encore garantir la qualité?” Le Monde, 17 Juin, p. 23.
Roosen, J., J.L. Lusk, and J.A. Fox. (2003).“Consumer Demand for and Atitudes Toward Alternative 
Beef Labeling Strategies in France, Germany, and the UK.” Agribusiness: An International
Journal 19: 77-90.
Scarpa, R., G. Philippidis, and F. Spalatro (2005). “Product-Country Images and Preferences
Heterogeneity for Mediterraean Food Products: A Discrete Choice Framework.” Agribusiness: An
International Journal 21(3): 329-349.
Stefani, G., D. Romano and A. Cavicchi (2005). “Size of Region of Origin and Consumer Wilingness to 
Pay for Speciality Foods: The Case of Italian Spelt.” Mimeo., University of Florence.
Sutton, J. (1992). Sunk Costs and Market Structure. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
Teisl, M., B. Roe, andA. Levy (1999). “Ecocertification: Why It May Not Be A ‘Field of Dreams.’”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(5): 1066-1071.
Valceschini, E. (2002).Les transformations d’un modèle contractuel centralisé: l’Interprofession des 
légumes transformés en France, Université d’Eté de l’innovation rurale, Marciac, Gers, 7-8 Août
2002, http://www.inra.fr/dpenv/acc01m02.htm#t4.
Westgren, R. (1999). “Delivering Food Safety, Food Quality, and Sustainable Production Practices: The
Label Rouge Poultry System in France.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81(5):
1107-1111.
Whirthgen, A. (2005). “Consumer, Retailer, and Producer Assessments of Product Differentiation
According to Regional Origin and Process Quality.”Agribusiness: An International Journal 21:
191-211.
WTO (World Trade Organization) (2005).“Panel Reports Out on Geographical Indications Disputes.” 
March 15, Geneva.
Zago, A., and D. Pick (2004). “Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention 
and Welfare.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 29(1): 150-169.
